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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By

HAROLD

E.

HURST

Professor of Law and Acting Dean, University of Denver College of Law

Attorneys reviewing the decisions of the supreme court of the
Centennial State, in the fields of constitutional law and administrative
law during 1958, will be at once pleased, astonished and confused.
Pleased with the court's insistence upon practical good sense in the
conduct of proceedings by administrative agencies and courts. Astonished
at the boldness with which the court takes a new course in waters thought
well-charted and marked with the buoys of precedent. And confused
by the diametrically opposite results arrived at in some of the cases.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

It is in the field of constitutional law that the most surprising decisions have come in the past year.
Is it Fish or Fowl?
In 1955 there appeared in the pages of DICTA' a rare gem of
satirical legal literature written by the Honorable Mitchell B. Johns,
Judge of the Superior Court of Denver, in which were dramatically
examined the incongruities of the Colorado rule that a violation of a
municipal ordinance imposing fine or imprisonment is tried as a civil
action. The doctrine was established early in Colorado jurisprudence,'
and has persisted despite the misgivings of judges who didn't like the
rule' but who felt bound by precedent. Judge Johns held up for all to
see a system in which a defendant in a civil action was denied a right
to answer, but rather required to plead guilty or not guilty; a system in
which, if the plea were not guilty, the defendant nevertheless might be
fined or imprisoned on a mere preponderance of the evidence in a trial
without a jury.
In one bold stroke, the Supreme Court of Colorado determined to
abandon the pseudo logic of former decisions. In Canon City v. Merris,
the court sustained a trial court rule that a person on trial for violation
of a city ordinance' punishable by fine or imprisonment was entitled to
all the constitutional guarantees traditionally surrounding criminal trials.
Operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor was a misdemeanor under a state statute' and punishable also
under the city ordinance."
In sustaining the dismissal of the case against Merris, the supreme
court began with the premise that the Home Rule Amendment of the
Colorado Constitution not only grants municipalities power to determine
local destiny, but also provides that, "any act in violation of the provisions of such charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal
132 DICTA 387 (1955).
2Dietz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323 (1871).
2Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892); Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 50 (1885).
4323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958).
6 Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The statute is not cited in the opinion, but the author confidently believes the statute alluded to may
be found at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-30 (1953).
7 The Canon

City ordinance Is not cited in the opinion.
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and punishable as such when so provided by any statute now or hereinafter in force."8

The court added:
"Even though an ordinance effectually covers a local and
municipal matter, and it is a counterpart of a law of the state,
its violation is triable and punishable as a crime where so
designated by the statute.
"Whether driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor is a municipal matter or of state-wide concern makes little
difference in the ultimate result of this case. Since there is a
statute making such conduct a crime, its counterpart in the
municipal laws of Canon City must be tried and punished as a
crime. The violation having been prosecuted and determined
as a proceeding civil in nature, the trial court was properly
moved to dismissal."'
The court then declared that driving a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor is a matter of state-wide concern
rather than local or municipal, leaving in no small doubt what the court
might hold if a home rule city prosecutes as a civil action the violation
of an ordinance imposing fine or imprisonment but going to strictly
local and municipal matters.
Perhaps the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Moore may
be taken as the law which will be applied in the future. From his concurring opinion we may set down the following propositions:
(1) A city has no power, by its legislative acts and its municipal
courts, to punish, in any kind of action, an act which is a matter of
state-wide concern.
(2) Where the city ordinance imposes punishment for an act of
purely local concern, but a state statute also imposes punishment for
an identical act if committed outside a home rule city, the state constitution commands that the trial in the municipal court be surrounded
with the traditional safeguards of criminal proceedings.
Later in the year, in the second Alaniz case," the court applied the
Merris case to invalidate, as being unconstitutional, section 1, subsection
7 of a 1955 amendment to the Charter of Denver, providing that, "No
party shall be entitled to a jury trial in the municipal court in any
action arising under the ordinances and charter of the City and County
of Denver." The judicial pronouncement is broad and seems to require
criminal procedure in the trial of any ordinance violation for which
imprisonment is imposed, without regard to state statutes or the locality
of concern involved in the act punished. The court said:
"The last sentence in said subsection ...is invalid wherever
the ordinance violated has a counterpart in the criminal statutes
of the State (citing Merris and other cases) or the ordinance,
although not a counterpart of a statute, provides for imprisonment for its violation (again citing Merris) ."
Whether fish or fowl, a criminal proceeding is now a criminal
proceeding, be it for a violation of a city ordinance or state statute.
Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (emphasis supplied).
0 323 P.2d at 620.
10 Geer v. Alaniz, 331 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1958).
"I Id. at 262.
8
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Former Jeopardy
In a case of first impression in Colorado," the supreme court held
that a defendant was once in jeopardy who had been charged, had
entered a plea of guilty on arraignment, and had been discharged by the
trial court at the conclusion of the pre-sentence hearing. The matter
came before the supreme court on a petition for a writ of prohibition
filed by the defendant below when he was a second time charged with
the same offense to which he had formerly pleaded guilty. Prohibition
was made absolute on the ground that, the petitioner having once been
arraigned and his plea of guilty accepted, a second trial for the same
offense was prohibited by article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution.
The case will be most interesting to many Colorado lawyers for its
dictum to the effect that a defendant is once in jeopardy when he has
been charged under a valid indictment or information, before a court of
competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned, has pleaded, and a jury has
been impanelled and sworn." The point at which former jeopardy
begins has been in some doubt in Colorado as a result of a dictum in
the Herman case:"
"... The plea of former jeopardy is available only when a
valid indictment or information has been found and presented;
and a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the case
and has returned a verdict."
If one dictum can have effect in cancelling or restricting another,
the court has adopted for Colorado the usual rule by which former
jeopardy is determined in those cases in which a defendant elects to
stand trial on a plea of not guilty.
Notice of the Proceedinig
5
In Weber v. Williams,"
the plaintiffs in a previous proceeding knew
the Chicago address of the equity owner defendant but never disclosed
the address to counsel, who obtained service f notice by publication.
In reversing and remanding the case, the supreme court said:
"Due process under applicable rules requires notice, by
actual or substituted service of process. Admittedly there was
no actual service. The order authorizing the service by publication was obtained by a verified motion, which no doubt was
made honestly and in good faith by plaintiff's attorney; however,
it contained a statement that was known by the plaintiffs, the
Williams, to be false.""
The court went on to hold that the failure by the plaintiffs to disclose their knowledge of the whereabouts of the defendant was fraud
upon the court and that such failure to disclose voided the jurisdiction
of the court in the absence of an appearance by the defendant.
It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether reversal was based
upon failure to meet the standards of due process or on failure to comply
"2Markiewicz v. Black, 330 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
13 Cited with obvious approval from 22 C.J.S CriminalLow §'241 (1940).
14 Herman v. People, 124 Colo. 46, 50, 233 P.2d 873, 876, (1951) (emphasis supplied).
1324 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1958).
"e Id. at 367

SACHS.LAULOR. CORPORATIOn SEALS-IILPInE 5-3422
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strictly with the rules of procedure regarding substituted service. However, the author would invite attention to such cases as Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 7 and Walker v. City of Hutchinson. 8 These cases hold that, to satisfy the requirements of due process,
something more effective than notice by publication must be given when
the whereabouts of a defendant can be ascertained with reasonable
diligence, even in the absence of fraud. Indeed, the cited cases make it
extremely hazardous to rely on service by publication without making a
search for the address of the defendant and forwarding a written notice
by first class or registered mail.
To Prohibit or Not to Prohibit
A curious, but highly important, confusion appears in the 1958
decisions dealing with petitions for judicial intervention in proceedings
in other agencies or tribunals. In our Anglo-American system we have
always, traditionally, looked to a court or a higher tribunal for relief
from unauthorized or unlawful harrassment at the hands of a government agent-be it judicial, executive or legislative. It has always been
deemed essential to the maintenance of liberty, and for the protection
of property rights, that unlawful impairment of such rights be prohibited or enjoined by the judiciary at an early moment, lest the victory
be Pyrrhic and a man's substance gone on the day he finally is adjudged
to be in the right. We ask with good reason, what does it profit a man
or society to compel a person to fight for a cause through the whole
hierarchy of tribunals, if his cause can be judged to be just at the outset
by a tribunal of higher authority. We spare the reader from citations
of authority for the propositions that equity will restrain the infliction
of injury for which-there is no adequate remedy, and courts will prohibit the exercise of power by a tribunal that has no authority over the
person or the cause.
Three cases reached the supreme court in 1958 in which the court
was asked to intervene in or pass upon the lawfulness of legislative,
administrative or lower judicial proceedings. In two of the cases the
supreme court agreed to pass judgment and terminate oppressive and
unlawful proceedings. But in the third case the court refused to intervene, subjecting its petitioner to months, perhaps years, of expensive
litigation of his rights in lower tribunals, and effectively suspending
the petitioner's means of livelihood.
In Markiewicz v. Black," the supreme court terminated, by writ of
prohibition, a second prosecution in the district court on the ground that
to prosecute the petitioner twice for the same offense is prohibited by
the state constitution."
In Denver v. Sweet,"' the court approved a district court injunction
restraining the City and County of Denver from holding a special
election to vote upon a charter amendment authorizing a city income
tax.
The third case. Board of Medical Examiners v. District Court,
held that the district court of El Paso County did not have power to
17339 U.S. 306 (1950).
18352 U.S. 112 (1956).
'9 330 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
20 Colo. Const. art II, § 18.
21329 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1958).
22331 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1958).

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

restrain or control the Board in advance of its taking final action, even
though the statute under which the Board purported to act was allegedly unconstitutional. Here the Board had begun a proceeding against
a doctor to determine if his license should be revoked. The doctor went
to the district court asking that court to terminate the proceedings before
the Board on the ground that the Board was acting without authority
under a valid statute.
We note at once that Board of Medical Examiners presents a situation identical to that in Denver v. Sweet-a request by a person,
alleging the threat of irreparable damage, that a court step in to decide
the validity of the authority under which another branch of the government purported to be acting, and, if the authority be found not to exist
because of constitutional infirmity, to restrain or prohibit the act. But
despite the similarity, the supreme court permitted relief to one complainant and denied relief to the other.
In Sweet, the court said, "We deem it pertinent to this decision to
say that in view of our holding hereinafter set forth, the action of the
trial court in enjoining the plaintiffs in error (Denver) and the other
defendants below was proper relief."2" The "holding hereinafter set
forth" was that under Art. X, Section 17, of the state constitution the
state had exclusive power to lay an income tax. And, "Since the City
has no power to levy the tax in question, it follows that the Council has
no authority to call a special election of the City's electors to confer such
forbidden power upon it."'" In this case the supreme court examined the
constitutionality of the city's authority to act, found that the city was
acting without valid authority, and restrained the city and its election
commission from holding the election.
The basis for the opposite result in Board of Medical Examiners was
stated thus:
".... (E) yen a claim, as urged in the complaint filed below,
that the statute under which a department of the executive is
proceeding is unconstitutional will not clothe the judiciary with
power to interfere or control such department in advance of
its taking final action in the premises. In other words, the
question of constitutionality is a matter to be raised by writ of
error after the executive has performed its function.''2

It clearly appears in the opinion that the court assumed the validity
of the statute under which the Board was acting, for the court said:
"... (T) his court must intervene when formally requested
where, as in the case at bar, the lower court is attempting to
restrain a duly authorized administrative board from performing its duty pursuant to laws passed by the General Assembly.""
(Emphasis supplied.)
But the court assumed too much, because the constitutionality of
the authorization was among the questions of law raised by the complainant below. At no point in its opinion did the court consider the
constitutional authority of the Board, but told the complainant that he
must submit to the jurisdiction of the Board and raise the constitutional
question on writ of error in protracted and expensive trial and appellate
proceedings. We note that the supreme court did not require the tax22329 P.2d at
24 Id. at 447.
22 331 P.2d at
20

Id. at 505.

444.
506.
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payers of Denver in Sweet to submit to the election and raise the question
of validity of a charter amendment, if adopted, by writ of error after a
trial on the merits in a district court. We note, too, that the supreme
court did not assume the validity of the second trial in Markiewicz,
requiring the defendant to submit to the second trial, interpose former
jeopardy as a special plea in bar, and then carry an adverse decision to the
supreme court on writ of error.
In Board of Medical Examiners there is an attempt to justify the
result by saying that, "Significantly, the respondent District Court did not
find the only fact which would support its action, namely, that the board
lacked jurisdiction."" Actually, the trial court had no opportunity to
decide that question because the cause was removed to the supreme
court after the district court ordered the Board to show cause (authority)
for its proceeding, but before the issue was joined and argued in the
district court.
To add to our confusion, the same supreme court said in Markiewicz:
"We hold that petitioners have been in jeopardy and it
appears from the record before us without contradiction, that
respondent is about to place them in jeopardy a second time for
the same offense. In such a case prohibition is a proper proceeding to protect petitioners in their constitutional right
against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense.""
There is no question but that the district court had jurisdiction.
Further, former jeopardy is a matter that is ordinarily raised on a special
plea in the trial court; and an adverse decision is ordinarily reviewed
on writ of error from the supreme court. Yet the supreme court intervened in Markiewicz and refused to do so in the much stronger and more
proper situation for doing so in Board of Medical Examiners. It seems
clear that one or the other case is bad law.
The author has discussed these three cases at such length because
he feels that a large reason for such seeming confusion and contradiction
is the burden of work undertaken by the supreme court without adequate
assistance-that here is clearly demonstrated a desperate need, in the
interest of law and justice, for paid full time clerks for the justices.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Only a few cases in the field of administrative law were decided by
the supreme court during 1958, other than those such as Board of
Medical Examiners discussed above. In none of the cases was there a
wide departure from previously established rules.
Hearsay as the Basis for a Finding
Johnson v. Industrial Commission" re-affinned the rule that an administrative agency may not base a finding upon hearsay uncorroborated
by some "residuum of legal evidence," and denounced the practice of
permitting an expert witness to review the evidence and state his
conclusion as a finding or opinion of fact as to what happened.
331 P.2d at 505.
330 P.2d at 543.
)328 P.2d 384 lColo. 1958),

27

28

1078 119571.

following Williams v. New Amsterdam Cos. Co.. 136 Colo. 458, 319 P.2d
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Findings Must Disclose Evidentiaiy Basis
The record made before administrative agencies and the finding of
such agencies must set forth more than a finding of the ultimate facts
upon which the agencies act. The agencies must include in their findings
a statement of the evidentiary facts which support their findings, so that
a reviewing court can evaluate the results of the proceedings and determine if the findings be in accordance with the evidence."
Administrative Rule Cannot Modify Statute
In a case in which the validity of a voting list was in question, the
supreme court held that, "When a statute clearly provides a method for
accomplishing a desired result, it follows that an administrative commission cannot set up a regulation which is contrary thereto. ""
What to Do-Remand or Decide
Illustrative of the variation in procedure from one administrative
agency to another, and of the desirability of a statutory code of administrative procedure applicable to all agencies, are three cases decided
during the past year dealing with the disposition of cases in which the
supreme court found error in findings of agencies.
In Johnson v. IndustrialCommission," it appeared to the court that
the finding was based on uncorroborated hearsay. The case was remanded to the commission to "make further determinations consonant
with the views herein expressed."
In two other cases the supreme court sustained trial court orders
directing administrative agencies to take action directly opposed to
purported findings of such agencies. In one, Lindner v. Copeland,"' the
State Board of Examiners of Architects denied Copeland a license. The
trial court, on review of such record as was made or compiled by the
Board, ordered the Board to issue the desired license. In the second case,
Geer v. Smaldone,"' the supreme court reviewed the record made by a
liquor licensing agency as if the matter had never been heard by the
trial court, and affirmed the trial court order directing the agency to
issue the license.
80

Lindner v. Copeland, 320 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1958).
:2 Graham Furniture Co. v. Industrial Commission, 331 P.2d 507 (Colo. 1958).
2 328 P.2d 384 (Co o. 1958).
83 320 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1958).
84 326 P.2d 978 (Colo. 1958, following Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146, ,309 P.2d 606 (1957).
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